










THE INTER-INSTITUTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF 







CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1347 










An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the CESifo website:           www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No. 1347 
 
THE INTER-INSTITUTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF 
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Ministers (CM) on legislation of the European Union adopted under its codecision procedure. 
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Voting Power and Procedures. 1 Introduction
The question of who has how much in°uence on legislation adopted by the European Union
(EU) is of interest and importance to politicians, the general public, and academics alike.
It has inspired both vigorous methodological debate and a great number of applied studies.
These applications have very much concentrated on the intra-institutional balance of power
in the EU's main decision-making bodies: Most of the literature investigates the national
distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers (CM)1, a few other studies evaluate
national and/or political parties' in°uence in the European Parliament (EP).2 If the aim
is to analyze power in the EU, purely intra-institutional analysis may, however, miss the
point. The study of either institution in isolation does not permit full statements about
power when both have to jointly modify or introduce new legislation. Even at the purely
intra-institutional level, in°uence formally depends on the full context of decision-making,
i.e. also how the institution interacts with its environment.
This paper therefore analyzes a somewhat neglected but important element of insti-
tutional design and the future EU: the inter-institutional balance of power. By taking a
wider than usual perspective on EU decision-making this paper sheds new light also on
purely intra-Council analysis. As regards methodology, we employ new tools that are able
to capture strategic inter-institutional interaction, which is not true for classical power
measures. The study is the ¯rst of its kind, applying the framework for power measure-
ment of Napel and Widgr¶ en (2004). The framework generalizes the measurement ideas
underlying e.g. the Penrose-Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik indices to non-cooperative mod-
els and preference-based strategic interaction. Thus the major limitations of traditional
indices are overcome (see Garrett and Tsebelis 1999 for details).
We analyze the relationship between CM and EP, the two key legislative bodies of the
EU, under the codecision procedure as de¯ned in Article 251 of the EC Treaty, the EU's
central legislative procedure. The main goal is to investigate the hypothesis that the EU
has { constitutionally speaking { moved towards a bicameral model which is balanced in
the sense that the intergovernmental chamber, CM, and the directly elected chamber, EP,
have equal in°uence on decisions (see e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000).
Measuring a player's power or constructive in°uence as the sensitivity of the collective
decision to his or her preferences, CM's a priori power turns out to exceed that of EP by an
order of magnitude: While a small shift of CM's position is on average passed through to the
collective decision at a rate of approximately 54%, changes of EP's position in expectation
induce a move of only about 4% of the original shift. This result is driven by two factors:
First, the potential agreement between EP and CM reached in the Conciliation Committee,
which under strategic play de¯nes the codecision outcome by backward induction, has
a pronounced status quo bias. Second, CM's quali¯ed majority requirement makes the
a priori distribution of its collective ideal point { corresponding to the distribution of the
1See e.g. Widgr¶ en (1994) or Laruelle and Widgr¶ en (1998) and references therein for the earlier literature,
and Baldwin et al. (2001), Felsenthal and Machover (2001, 2004), Leech (2002), or Barr and Passarelli
(2003) for recent contributions.
2See e.g. Noury and Roland (2002) and the references in Nurmi (1998).
1ideal point of its pivotal member { considerably more `conservative' than that resulting
from EP's simple majority rule. Thus, on average, CM is far more often the critical player
in determining the codecision outcome.
Power measurement using sensitivity analysis allows to make statements about which
players do really shape collective decisions { and which do not. A lobbyist whose objective
is to shift the state of a®airs in some policy area, say carbon emission levels, the speed of
electricity deregulation or smaller things like the fat contents of chocolate, would only want
to address political actors who have in°uence according to our strategic power measure;
moreover, the value of di®erent political actors from a lobbyist's viewpoint is ex ante
monotonic in the pass-through rate for preference shifts as identi¯ed by our measure.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the codecision
procedure and points to recent research on it. Section 3 introduces a simple model which
aims to capture the crucial aspects of, ¯rst, inter-institutional bargaining between EP and
CM for given internal positions and, second, intra-institutional decision making determin-
ing these positions. Section 4 introduces our method of power measurement and contrasts
it with conventional power index applications. Section 5 then quanti¯es inter-institutional
power in EU codecision and discusses remaining limitations of our investigation. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Codecision Procedure
The European Union's codecision procedure was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in
1993 and initially applied to 15 areas of Community activity. Its current version came into
force in May 1999 by the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997. Presently, it pertains to
43 areas { including the internal market, environment, transport, public health, education
and research, and the Regional Development Fund (notably not including agriculture and
taxation). The number of codecisions has increased dramatically over the years, from an
annual average of 30 in the Maastricht period to more than 100. According to the former
President of the European Parliament, Pat Cox, \the procedure has been a major success,
enabling Parliament to become an equal partner of the Council and to make its voice heard
in shaping the lives of European citizens" (Cox 2004, p. 3).
The procedure potentially involves up to three readings of proposed legislation by EP
and CM. It is initiated by a policy proposal of the European Commission. First, EP
can approve this proposal or replace it with an amended version of its own. Then, CM
either approves the proposal on the table or initiates a second stage of decision-making
by making amendments.4 This new proposal { CM's `common position' in EU parlance {
3See Morriss (1987/2002, pp. 161{165 and 223{228) and Felsenthal and Machover (1998, pp. 35{36) for
an interpretation of the Shapley-Shubik and Penrose-Banzhaf power indices in a similar vein.
4In their ¯rst readings, EP and CM do not have any time limit. Second readings are to be con-
cluded within three months (extendable by one month), respectively. { These procedural details are
unspeci¯ed in the EC Treaty, but laid out in a joint declaration of Commission, EP, and CM on
practical arrangements. The Co-decision Guide, available from the Council of the European Union
2EC: European Commission
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Figure 1: Stylized codecision game tree
is either approved by EP or, again, amended. If in the latter case CM does not accept
EP's proposal,5 the Conciliation Committee represents the ¯nal chance to { within six
weeks (extendable to eight weeks) { seek a change to the status quo. The Committee is
composed of all (currently 25) members of CM (or, usually, their civil servant delegates)
and a delegation of members of EP (MEPs) of the same size; it is co-chaired by an EP
Vice-President and the Minister holding the Council Presidency without ¯xed negotiation
protocol. The Commission only has an informal supporting role in the Committee. If
CM and EP agree on a compromise, it is submitted to CM and EP for acceptance in a
third reading in which CM and EP use their typical quali¯ed and absolute majority rules,
respectively.6
The natural formalization of the interaction between Commission, EP, and CM in the
codecision procedure is by means of an extensive form game (see Fig. 1). The bargain-
ing outcome that EP, CM, and also the Commission expect to result from invoking the
Conciliation Committee plays a crucial role at earlier stages of the procedure. Using back-
ward induction it is straightforward to conclude that it is indeed the determinant of any
codecision agreement if all players act strategically.7
(http://ue.eu.int/codec/en/EN.pdf), o®ers comprehensive information.
5The Commission { by a negative opinion on EP's proposal { can require CM to accept unanimously.
EP and CM have six weeks (extendable to eight) to prepare the convening of the Conciliation Committee.
6In fact, 3 out of the 43 policy areas require a unanimous CM. We concentrate on the quali¯ed majority
case.
7The actual use of the Conciliation Committee as the means to ¯nd an agreement has decreased
signi¯cantly since its introduction. During 1994{99 the annual average share of codecisions concluded
after the Conciliation phase was 40% while in 2002{2003 and 2003{2004 it was 15% and 16%, respectively.
3Accepted new legislation will usually come into e®ect at some date in the medium-term
future. It therefore is reasonable to assume that neither EP nor CM has a pronounced
preference for agreeing on a policy change a few weeks sooner rather than later. The
codecision outcome can then be identi¯ed with the policy which CM and EP expect to agree
on in Conciliation (either a new policy or the status quo, in which case a Commission with
rational expectations need not even initiate the procedure). Therefore, our quantitative
analysis of EP's and CM's in°uence on codecision outcomes can actually be con¯ned to
the Conciliation stage.
Several authors have already devoted their attention to codecision and the Conciliation
Committee, including Steunenberg and Dimitrova (1999), Crombez (1997, 2000), Tsebelis
and Garrett (2000), and Steunenberg and Selck (2002). However, their assessments of
who shapes the agreements reached by EP and CM { and hence the distribution of power
between these two players { are mostly qualitative, as well as diverging.
Crombez regards EP as the agenda setter in the Conciliation Committee but concludes
nevertheless that both EP and CM \genuinely codecide which policy to implement" (1997,
p. 113). His analysis does not discriminate much between the Maastricht and Amsterdam
versions of codecision, although the original version laid out in the Treaty of Maastricht
was revised speci¯cally in order to make the procedure more symmetric.8 Tsebelis and
Garrett (2000) focus on the Amsterdam version and argue that the EU has moved a long
way towards bicameralism. They ¯nd no reason to suggest that either CM or EP is favored
by the procedure, so that both can be expected to have the same in°uence. In contrast,
Steunenberg and Dimitrova (1999) observe an advantage to CM in a model that assumes
the Council president to make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er to EP. The commitment problems
associated with such o®ers are an important, but not the only, reason which make this
assumption controversial. It also builds an inter-institutional asymmetry into the model,
and not surprisingly gives greater power to CM. However, we ¯nd that Steunenberg and
Dimitrova's conclusion of a signi¯cant advantage for CM can remain valid also for symmet-
ric bicameral bargaining, as assumed by Garrett and Tsebelis. Key to this conclusion are
factually asymmetric intra-institutional majority rules, whose important inter-institutional
impact the literature on power in the EU has so far neglected.
3 Predicted Codecision Outcomes
Quantitative analysis of codecision outcomes { and based on it the power distribution
between Council and Parliament { requires some kind of model. This should be as simple
as possible, but not simpler. We deem it inappropriate to force the extensive form game
sketched above into the mould of simple voting games, excluding therefore the { after such
a reduction { straightforward computation of e.g. the Penrose-Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik
Slightly less than 40% of legislation was already enacted by the ¯rst readings of EP and CM in 2003{2004
(European Parliament 2004).
8See e.g. the comments by Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), Tsebelis and Money (1997), Crombez (2000),
Crombez et al. (2000), and Garrett et al. (2001).
4power indices (Penrose 1946 and Banzhaf 1965; Shapley and Shubik 1954). Instead we
will assume a particular policy space, preferences for players which are all assumed to
be rational and strategic, plus some more structure for negotiations in the Conciliation
Committee. This allows us to then apply standard game-theoretic solution concepts and
use the generalized framework for power measurement outlined in Sect. 4.
We will consider a convex Euclidean policy space X µ Rn with metric d, where for
most of the analysis n = 1 and X = [0;1]. The considered political actors have single-
peaked preferences characterized by an individual bliss point or ideal point ¸ 2 X: The
smaller the distance d(¸;x), the higher the agent values a policy x 2 X. This is a standard
assumption. We also suppose that not only do individual members of EP and CM have
such preferences but { at least during their dealings in the Conciliation Committee {
there are representatives of both EP and CM who possess spatial preferences of the same
kind. It is then possible to predict the Conciliation { and thus codecision { outcome by
specifying, ¯rst, how EP's and CM's respective internal decision rules translate preferences
of individual members into the institutions' ideal points ¼ (for Parliament) and ¹ (for
Ministers) and, second, how the institutions' (collective) preferences jointly determine an
agreement. We start by addressing the latter.
3.1 Inter-institutional Bargaining
Models which determine an agreement based on a given status quo and EP's and CM's
ideal policies have been investigated in considerable detail by Napel and Widgr¶ en (2003).
It is argued there that { mainly because of highly unrealistic requirements for agents'
commitment opportunities { ultimatum bargaining with either CM or EP making a take-
it-or-leave-it o®er (as con°ictingly proposed by Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 1999, and
Crombez, 2000, respectively) is no particularly useful model of the Conciliation Committee.
Alternating o®ers bargaining with multiple rounds seems more realistic. Since there is no
focal number of rounds, Rubinstein's (1982) in¯nite horizon bargaining model becomes the
natural benchmark. As shown by Binmore (1987), the utility levels achieved in Rubinstein's
subgame perfect equilibrium can conveniently be approximated by the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution (Nash 1950, Kalai 1977) if players { as we have assumed above { are
almost indi®erent to the period of reaching an agreement. The latter predicts the agreement









where U denotes the set of all feasible utility combinations constructed by mapping each
policy x 2 X to the utility pair u = (u¼;u¹) = (uEP(x);uCM(x)) that re°ects players' pref-
erences for it. Exponents ® and ¯ are a function of possibly asymmetric time preferences
of EP and CM and uq ´ (uEP(q);uCM(q)) summarizes players' evaluation of the status quo
situation.
We see neither empirical nor theoretical reasons to consider either EP or CM a more
impatient or skilled bargainer. So we will use the symmetric Nash bargaining solution (i.e.,
5® = ¯ > 0 in (1)) to predict the Conciliation agreement and, using backward induction, the
codecision outcome. For the benchmark case of a unidimensional policy space and utility
that linearly decreases with distance to the ideal point, we obtain the following prediction
x¤(¼;¹) for the agreed policy:
Proposition 1 Assume that preferences of EP and CM are represented by utility functions
ui(x) = ¡d(¸i;x) for ¸i;x 2 X µ R where X is convex. Then the symmetric Nash bargain
corresponds to agreement on the ideal point which is closer to the status quo whenever there
are gains from trade, i.e.
sign(q ¡ ¼) = sign(q ¡ ¹) =) x
¤(¼;¹) =
½
¼; d(¼;q) · d(¹;q)
¹; d(¼;q) > d(¹;q):
Proof. For d(¼;q) = d(¹;q) the result is trivial. So consider gains from trade and
d(¼;q) < d(¹;q). On contract curve C = [minf¼;¹g;maxf¼;¹g] the sum of utilities of
EP and CM is constant and equals ¡d(¼;¹). The Nash bargain thus corresponds to the
maximizer of
N(u¼;u¹) = (u¼ + d(¼;q))(u¹ + d(¹;q)) (2)





d[(u¼ + d(¼;q))(¡d(¼;¹) ¡ u¼ + d(¹;q))]
du¼
= ¡ 2u¼ + d(¹;q) ¡ d(¼;q) ¡ d(¼;¹)
where d(¼;q) < d(¹;q) implies d(¹;q) ¡ d(¼;q) = d(¼;¹). So N(¢) increases for u¼ < 0
and achieves its unique maximum at u¼ = 0. This is equivalent to x¤(¼;¹) = ¼.
The result is illustrated in Fig. 2. The strategic bargaining behavior captured by the
Nash solution makes the intuitively appealing prediction of a symmetric compromise too
quick: EP and CM do not agree on some policy `in the middle' but the party less eager
to replace the status quo gets exactly its ideal policy. This extreme instance of status quo
bias of bargaining rests on unidimensional X and linear utility. However, the bias itself is
a very robust phenomenon:
Proposition 2 Assume that preferences of EP and CM on convex X µ Rn are represented
by utility functions ui(x) ´ u(d(¸i;x)) which are strictly decreasing and weakly concave in
d(¸i;x) and yield a Pareto frontier described by a function Á: uEP(x) 7! maxfuCM(y): y 2
X and uEP(y) = uEP(x)g which is di®erentiable on the interior of the contract curve. Then
the symmetric Nash bargain x¤(¼;¹) ´ x¤ is closer to the ideal point which is closer to the
status quo, i.e.

















Figure 2: Bargaining set U and Nash bargain u¤
The proof is provided in the appendix. If EP's and CM's utility is strictly concave
(corresponding to risk aversion or decreasing marginal returns from moving closer to the
considered player's ideal point, e.g. ~ u(¸;x) = ¡(¸ ¡ x)2), then U's Pareto frontier, con-
necting the two extreme utility levels u ´ (0; ~ u(¹;¼)) and u ´ (~ u(¼;¹);0), becomes strictly
concave as well. Keeping the symmetry between EP and CM (they have the same under-
lying utility function ~ u(¸i;x), just di®erent ideal points), this implies that the hyperbola
corresponding to the highest attainable level of the product of both players' utility gains
touches the Pareto frontier no longer at its right endpoint (cf. Fig. 2), but somewhere
between it and the middle of the curve.
Similarly, for multidimensional policy spaces, status quo bias remains important: The
agreement will generically correspond to an interior point of the contract curve C which
is closer to the institution with smaller status quo distance. It approaches the latter's
preferred endpoint of C as the angle between vectors ¼ ¡ q and ¹ ¡ q gets small. In
case of convex utility and the special case of spatial preferences considered in this paper,
the individually rational and Pareto-e±cient policy x¤ most bene¯cial to the player with
smallest status quo distance remains the focal prediction.9 Moreover, status quo bias is
robust to the introduction of moderately asymmetric bargaining powers ® and ¯ in the
Nash bargaining solution (and hence slight di®erences between EP's and CM's patience
in Rubinstein bargaining). For details on this and the connection to ¯nite and in¯nite
horizon alternating o®ers bargaining see Napel and Widgr¶ en (2003).
9See e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, pp. 16®) or Harsanyi (1956) for justi¯cations of the constrained
maximizer u¤ of (2), which corresponds to x¤, as the expected bargaining result that do not rely on Nash's
original axiomatic argument and do not assume convex U.
73.2 Intra-institutional Decisions
Before EP and CM can negotiate in the Conciliation Committee, they have to internally
agree on their respective bargaining positions. While it is typically only the member holding
the Presidency of the Council who speaks on its behalf, parliamentary delegates { MEPs
in approximately EP's party proportion { often express heterogenous views. So for both
practical and theoretical reasons our presumption of spatial preferences characterizing EP
and CM as monolithic rational bargainers is somewhat bold. We still regard it as the best
available route for estimating power of these institutions. Here, we consider the question
of how ideal points ¼ and ¹ attributed to EP and CM in their negotiations may reasonably
be linked to the ideal points of the institutions' individual members. We concentrate on
the theoretically least contentious case of a unidimensional policy space X.
Consider ¯rst the European Parliament. Its currently 732 members need to approve
any Conciliation compromise by simple majority.10 Entering negotiations with CM about
some policy change to the right of the status quo q, some of the potential positions of
the EP delegation are such that a majority of MEPs would ¯nd it bene¯cial to intervene
and select a di®erent delegation. More concretely, denote the ordered ideal points of all
MEPs by ¼(1) · ¼(2) · ::: · ¼(732) and consider a provisional bargaining position ¼
with q < ¼ < ¼(366). Parliamentarians with ideal points ¼(366);:::;¼(732) then have the
necessary majority and common interest to instead select some delegation with ¼ ¸ ¼(366)
as EP's position for Conciliation negotiations. Similarly, parliamentarians with ideal points
¼(1);:::;¼(367) would block a position ¼ > ¼(367). One can hence restrict EP's ideal point
in negotiations about policies x > q to ¼ 2 [¼(366);¼(367)]. According to the strategic
bargaining model of the previous section it is the institution whose ideal point is closer
to the status quo which is determining the Conciliation agreement. With this in mind we
take the in°uence-maximizing ¼ = ¼(366) to be EP's position in negotiations about x > q
and refer to the corresponding MEP as EP's pivotal player. By analogous reasoning, we
identify EP with position ¼ = ¼(367) for policies x < q.
Note that, in principle, the internal position of EP need not coincide with the position
taken by its delegation to the Conciliation Committee. In general, there could be gains
from strategically picking a delegation whose interests diverge from the pivotal voter's (see
e.g. Segendor® 1998). However, under the above assumptions this cannot be advantageous:
By Prop. 1, any Conciliation agreement replacing the status quo amounts to the ideal point
of EP's or CM's delegation. Picking an EP delegation with a position to the left or right
of its `true' ideal point ¼ thus has either no e®ect (CM's position is closer to status quo)
or actually hurts EP's pivot. Namely, it may induce agreement on the distorted position
¼0 instead of ¼ when this would have been the outcome in the unmanipulated case, or it
prevents agreement on the position of CM when that is actually closer to ¼ than ¼0 and
hence preferable by EP's pivot.
The Council of Ministers, with the Treaty of Nice slightly modi¯ed by the Act Con-
cerning the Conditions of Accession for the EU's enlargement in 2004, decides nearly all
10There actually have been 2 out of 86 Conciliation agreements in the last 5-year parliamentary term
which failed to be approved by EP.
8issues pertaining to the codecision procedure by a quali¯ed majority with three dimensions:
First, there have to be at least 232 votes out of 321 (¼ 72:2%) in favor of a proposal, with
29 votes each for France, Italy, Germany, and the UK, 27 votes each for Poland and Spain,
etc. Second, these votes have to be cast by a simple majority of member states. Third, the
`yes'-votes have to represent 62% of total EU population. The second and third require-
ments have almost negligible e®ect on the possible winning coalitions (see e.g. Felsenthal
and Machover, 2001) and a®ect the quantitative results presented in Sect. 5 only at the
5th or 6th digit. In fact, there is little loss of precision { but considerable gain in terms of
computation { from ignoring even the country-speci¯c weights of the ¯rst requirement. So
for much of our quantitative analysis we will assume uniform voting with an 18 out of 25
(= 72%) majority rule. This is a good approximation of CM's internal decision making as
regards the inter-institutional distribution of power, while for intra-institutional analysis
of in°uence inside CM national weights would, of course, be essential. In line with the
reasoning for EP, we will identify CM with ¹ = ¹(8) in negotiations about x > q and
¹ = ¹(18) for policies x < q.11
It can be checked that negotiations in the Conciliation Committee can, for given pref-
erences of MEPs and members of CM, never be simultaneously about policies x > q and
policies x0 < q: If both institutions would support, say, moving to the right of the status
quo, i.e. both ¼(366) and ¹(8) lie to the right of q, then there is necessarily insu±cient
support for any x < q because ¼(367) ¸ ¼(366) and ¹(18) ¸ ¹(8) must also lie to the right of
q.
Also note that when weighted voting in CM is assumed { as we will do discussing the
robustness of our more qualitative ¯ndings in Sect. 5.4 { one cannot determine CM's pivotal
player by looking only at a ¯xed order statistic ¹(i). Rather, one needs to aggregate voting
weights of the players in the right order. One thus ¯nds the endogenous pivotal position p
which then allows to use ¹(p) as a reasonable proxy for CM's position in codecision.
4 Measurement of Strategic Power
If our goal were to give an estimate of the power distribution for the current Council
and Parliament in the context of the presently most pressing political issues, the way to
proceed would be to look at data and estimate players' coordinates in a number of policy
dimensions (see e.g. Pajala and Widgr¶ en 2004 for empirical analysis of intra-institutional
power in this vein). However, this is not our goal. We want to investigate EP's and CM's
in°uence on codecision outcomes from a constitutional point of view, caring about possible
structural biases. These may translate into a smaller or larger actual bias depending
on actual preferences. We therefore ignore the positions of MEPs and Council members
11The bounds on ¹ implied by blocking considerations are not as tight as in the case of EP. The
member holding the Council's presidency may plausibly use its agenda-setting power to select the ¹ 2
[¹(8);minf2¹(8);¹(18)g] for x > q that it prefers. The e®ect is to somewhat weaken the aggregate power
of CM in inter-institutional bargaining to the individual bene¯t of the Presidency. A detailed analysis of
this issue is beyond the scope of this paper; it would not change our qualitative ¯ndings.
9involved in yesterday's or today's politics. Instead, we consider random ideal points that
are drawn independently from the same distribution for both MEPs and ministers. Thus,
any systematic bias in in°uence must result from institutional rules rather than di®erences
between the politicians involved in either decision body.
In order to obtain quantitative statements, we apply the new framework for analysis of
power in collective decision making proposed by Napel and Widgr¶ en (2004). It de¯nes a
player's a priori power in a given decision procedure and for a given probabilistic distribu-
tion of all relevant players' preferences as the expected change to the equilibrium collective
decision which would be brought about by a change in this player's preferences. Alterna-
tively, one could also make probabilistic assumptions about players' actions, rather than
preferences which induce actions. Traditional power indices take this `short-cut', but thus
lose the ability to transparently account for strategic interaction.
In a spatial voting context, the framework links power to the question: Which impact
would a marginal or ¯xed-size shift of a given player's ideal policy have on the collective
decision? Or suppose that a player (or a lobbyist with in°uence over the player) wanted
to move the collective decision in some direction, to what degree would he succeed?12 This
approach to power measurement via a sensitivity analysis of collective decisions generalizes
the weighted counting of players' pivot positions which is the basis of conventional power
indices.13 The general measurement strategy is to start with a well-de¯ned model of the
decision situations which can arise, then to predict a (possibly stochastic) outcome and
the a posteriori power associated with it for each situation, and ¯nally to aggregate this
information using a probability measure on decision situations with a priori credentials.
For the rest of the paper we will assume a unidimensional policy space X = [0;1] and
linear spatial preferences. Decision situations are hence characterized by all actors' ideal






¼ if q < ¼ · ¹ or ¹ < ¼ < q;
¹ if q < ¹ < ¼ or ¼ · ¹ < q;
q otherwise
as the bargaining outcome. To evaluate a posteriori power, we consider the e®ect of a
marginal shift of ideal points ¼ and ¹ to the left or right on this policy outcome (see Napel
and Widgr¶ en 2004 for some alternatives). It is captured by the partial derivatives of the
predicted outcome. So the a posteriori power of EP for a given realization of status quo q





1 if q < ¼ < ¹ or ¹ < ¼ < q;
0 if q < ¹ < ¼; ¼ < ¹ < q; ¼ < q < ¹; or ¹ < q < ¼: (3)
12Note that a player can well be powerful in de¯ning the collective decision without being the one to
bene¯t the most from it, i.e. without being particularly successful. This does not happen in the model
used in this paper.
13All established indices for simple games, such as the Penrose-Banzhaf index or the Shapley-Shubik
index, can be obtained in this generalized framework by rather simple distribution assumptions and decision
protocols. See Napel and Widgr¶ en (2004) for details.
10This formalizes that any (small) change of the player's ideal point with smaller status quo
distance translates into a same-size shift of the agreed policy, provided there is agreement
about changing the status quo at all.
A priori, the expected impact that any marginal shift of EP's ideal policy ¼ would have
on the codecision outcome is therefore
»¼ = Pr(~ q < ~ ¼ < ~ ¹) + Pr(~ ¹ < ~ ¼ < ~ q); (4)
where ~ q, ~ ¼, and ~ ¹ denote the random variables corresponding to status quo and ideal points.
Not surprisingly, a priori power crucially depends on the a priori distribution assumption
for EP's and CM's ideal points and the status quo. Recall that we do not try to quantify
today's politics in this constitutional analysis. In the absence of compelling reasons to do
otherwise, we assume that the status quo is uniformly distributed on X (i.e. we simply




Pr(q < ~ ¼ < ~ ¹)dq +
Z 1
0
Pr(~ ¹ < ~ ¼ < q)dq: (5)
We also assume that individual members of EP and CM have random ideal points ~ ¼1;:::; ~ ¼732
and ~ ¹1;:::; ~ ¹25 drawn independently from the uniform distribution on X = [0;1]. This
is the natural generalization to our spatial voting setting of a uniform distribution over
coalitions or player orderings, which is the assumption underlying the Penrose-Banzhaf
and Shapley-Shubik indices, and the impartial culture and anonymous impartial culture
assumptions used in the social choice literatue.
For the moment, ignore that the members of CM have a rather complex weighted
voting rule and assume one-man-one-vote in both EP and CM. Since we assume uniform
ideal points for MEPs (and members of CM) the order statistics ~ ¼(366) and ~ ¼(367) whose
realizations have been motivated in Sect. 3.2 as de¯ning EP's position in codecision (and
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and analogous density and cumulative distribution functions for ~ ¹(8) and ~ ¹(18). Exploit-
ing symmetry properties for order statistics of random variables with identical symmetric
11distributions (see e.g. Arnold et al., 1992, p. 26), which amounts to acknowledging that
situations in which both EP and CM want to change policy to the right or, respectively,
the left of the status quo are symmetric, the two summands in (6) can be shown to be
equal. Our measure of strategic power14 for EP therefore becomes





[F~ ¼(367)(¹) ¡ F~ ¼(367)(q)]f~ ¹(18)(¹)d¹dq: (7)
The expression for CM is analogous.
In case of weighted voting in the Council, its ideal point ¹ can no longer be identi¯ed
with ¹(8) and ¹(18). The current asymmetric weights used in the European Union imply
that, considering a policy x < q, the pivotal member of CM may be at position p = 13, 14,
:::, 21, or 22. The exact probabilities for these events can be calculated.15 One can then
evaluate the weighted-voting analogue of (7) by replacing f~ ¹(18)(x) with a corresponding
density f~ ¹(~ p)(x) (see Sect. 5.4). This is a computationally arduous task. So, with no
qualitative and little quantitative loss, most of the following analysis concentrates on the
one-country-one-vote approximation of CM.
5 Results
As noted above, a priori power in EU decision-making has been analyzed with power indices
de¯ned on the domain of cooperative simple games in many studies (see e.g. Nurmi, 1998,
ch. 7, or Holler and Owen, 2001, for overviews). Condensing the codecision procedure
into that dichotomous 0-1-framework yields a unanimity game in which both players have
equal a priori power. Given the lack of any obvious asymmetry between CM and EP
inside the Conciliation Committee or the procedure as such, this might seem a reasonable
assessment at ¯rst sight, loosely corresponding to qualitative conclusions of Crombez (2000)
and Tsebelis and Garrett (2000). An analysis based on the explicit game-theoretic model
studied here, however, leads to a very di®erent assessment { and one which we maintain
is more convincing.
In particular, we ¯nd that CM is by an order of magnitude more in°uential in codecision
than EP. In the following, we ¯rst point out the intuition behind this result by looking at
the somewhat arti¯cial case of the status quo ¯xed to q ´ 0. We then discuss results for
varying status quo. We also look at di®erent possible majority requirements inside CM
14For a detailed discussion and derivation of this measure in general applications, see Napel and Widgr¶ en
(2004).
15Note that these probabilities are an interesting positional analogue of the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI),
but not equivalent to it: The SSI corresponds to the probability that some player is pivotal given that
all ideal point con¯gurations on [0;1] are equally likely. Here, we need the probability that some position
hosts the pivotal player, e.g. that the agent who just brings about the required majority is, say, the 14th
counted from the left. For simple voting with a k out of n rule, this `positional SSI' would be 1 for position






























Figure 3: Distribution of pivotal ideal point in Council and Parliament
and compare the current European Union of 25 members with the former one of only 15.
Enlargement signi¯cantly decreased EP's in°uence on codecision. Finally, we discuss the
robustness of our ¯ndings concerning the one-country-one-vote simpli¯cation of CM and
the assumed independence of actors' ideal points.
5.1 Fixed Legislative Status Quo
If the reference point for an agreement, q, is uniformly distributed as assumed above,
there may frequently be no mutual gains from an agreement. For the moment, let us
¯x the legislative status quo to zero so that there are gains from trade: players agree
about the direction but not the degree of change. This might be regarded as a kind of
interim analysis of the Conciliation phase invoked when a mutually acceptable compromise
is known to exist.
For q ´ 0, the predicted outcome is always the ideal point ¼ or ¹ which is closer to 0.
The expected impact of a marginal shift of EP's ideal policy on the collective decision is
shown in row 1 of Table 1: a shift in CMs ideal point by a small amount ¢¹ in expectation
shifts the outcome by 0:976 ¢ ¢¹; in contrast, a shift in EPs position ¼ is passed through
at a rate of only 0.024. This is a striking asymmetry of in°uence on outcomes.
Its intuitive explanation is that bargaining's status quo bias translates the event \CM is
more conservative" into \CM de¯nes x¤" and \CM has power". The distribution of CM's
and EP's ideal points as derived from their respective majority rules (see Fig. 3) implies
that CM indeed is the more conservative institution much more often than EP. This seems
in line with anecdotal evidence on the EU. It remains true and drives results also in the
case of a status quo allowed to vary from issue to issue.
13Model Parliament Council
1 Fixed status quo (EP732-CM25) 0.024 0.976
2 Varying status quo (EP732-CM25) 0.023 0.590
3 Varying status quo (EP626-CM15) 0.061 0.557
4 Varying status quo, weighted voting in CM (EP732-CM25) 0.037 0.543
5 Varying status quo, weighted voting in CM (EP7-CM25) 0.089 0.464
6 Varying status quo, weighted voting in CM (EP1-CM25) 0.097 0.390
Table 1: Inter-institutional distribution of power in the EU
5.2 Varying Status Quo
Now let status quo q vary uniformly on X = [0;1]. Again, approximate the Council's
complex weighted voting rule by one-country-one-vote with, crucially, a quali¯ed majority
requirement as discussed in Sect. 4. One obtains 0:023 and 0:590 as ex ante power values
for EP and CM respectively (row 2 in Table 1). While a small shift of CM's position is
passed through to the collective decision at a rate of approximately 59%, an opinion change
¢¹ of EP has almost negligible e®ect on policy { causing a move ¢x¤ which in expectation
amounts to only about 2% of the original shift of EP's position.
The main e®ect of considering a varying status quo is that there may not be gains from
trade between EP's and CM's respective pivotal players. If their ideal points happen to lie
on opposite sides of the status quo, the latter will just be con¯rmed.16 For such preference
con¯gurations neither EP nor CM has any constructive in°uence on EU politics and would
not be worth lobbying. Compared to the conditional in°uence for q ´ 0 in the previous
section, this possibility of not in°uencing the status quo at all restricts CM's power more
than EP's, in both absolute and relative terms.
Figure 4 depicts (interpolated) numbers for alternative quali¯ed majority rules. While
in°uence of EP on codecision outcomes monotonically approaches zero as the Council moves
towards a unanimity requirement, CM's in°uence is inversely U-shaped. CM's power is
maximized approximately when it has a 65% quali¯ed majority rule. The impact of a quota
change on CM's in°uence on decisions is two-fold. On the one hand, a quota increase raises
the probability that the CM pivot is closer to status quo than the EP pivot conditional
on existence of mutually bene¯cial policy changes. This may be labelled the relative vote
threshold e®ect of higher quota (from an intergovernmentalist's perspective bene¯cial, from
a parliamentarist's perspective detrimental); it is nicely picked up by conditional analysis
with q ´ 0 (see previous section). On the other hand, higher CM quota also lowers the
probability of CM pivot and EP pivot ¯nding themselves on the same side of the status
quo. If they do not, there is no acceptable alternative to the latter and hence no in°uence
for either institution { a detrimental absolute vote threshold e®ect. Strategic power is
16Anticipating this, the Commission may not even start the codecision procedure by putting a proposal
on the table. This may explain why cases of terminal disagreement in the Conciliation Committee or of




























Figure 4: Inter-institutional distribution of power in EU25 for di®erent quotas
determined by the product of both. Up to about 65%, the relative e®ect of quota changes
dominates. Above this level, the absolute e®ect begins to dominate: CM as an institution
loses power in absolute terms but relative power as measured by »¹=(»¹+»¼) would increase.
Note that CM being considerably more powerful in the codecision procedure than EP
does not mean that CM is `better o®' than EP. The ideal point ¼ deduced from its pivotal
member's preferences is a useful device to predict codecision outcomes, and hence to gauge
who on average shapes it to what extent. It does not, however, yield a meaningful welfare
indicator for the institution. Such an indicator might be constructed using a measure of
average success of members of CM, and then might be compared to a similar measure for
EP.
Our question goes in a di®erent direction: How in°uential is the European Parliament
(which represents the people of the Union) in comparison to the Council of Ministers
(which represents national governments) in the EU's central decision procedure? For this
we get a clear answer: much less than a casual look at the seemingly symmetric codecision
procedure would suggest. Moreover, Fig. 4 illustrates that even the governments' scope
for exercising constructive in°uence through codecision is limited by its internal quali¯ed
majority rule. For those 3 out of 43 areas in which codecision requires CM's unanimity17
chances to have EP and CM agree are less than 8%.
Claims that the gradual extension of the codecision procedure to more of the EU's
policy areas has moved EU decision making towards a balanced bicameral system need to
17Unanimity is required for measures in the ¯eld of social security as are necessary to provide freedom of
movement of workers (Art. 42), mutual recognition of diplomas, certi¯cates, etc. in order to make it easier
to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons (Art. 47) and recommendations in the ¯eld of





























Figure 5: Distribution of power in EU15 compared with EU25
be quali¯ed. The codecision procedure is clearly that of the EU's legislative procedures in
which EP's in°uence is greatest. Still, it is very small.18
5.3 Enlargement and Reforms
The most recent enlargement from a Union of 15 to one of 25 members had implications
for the inter-institutional balance of power at least from an a priori point of view. The
numbers for CM using an 11 out of 15 rule (again approximating the weighted voting rule
by one-country-one-vote) and EP using simple majority for 626 members are 0.061 for EP
and 0.557 for CM, respectively.
In°uence on codecision outcomes was already quite asymmetric in EU15. This has
been magni¯ed by enlargement: it has slightly increased CM's in°uence and considerably
decreased EP's in°uence (compare rows 2 and 3 in Table 1). Figure 5 shows the impact of
the eastern enlargement on EP's and CM's strategic power for various quotas. The change
in membership inter-plays with the mentioned absolute and relative threshold e®ects. For
low quotas, the relative vote threshold e®ect works stronger in favour of CM after enlarge-
ment. The turning point beyond which the absolute e®ect dominates is, however, reached
at lower vote threshold level than in EU15. The absolute e®ect then decreases CM's power
at faster pace in the enlarged EU than it did in EU15. This implies that, at high quotas,
18EP also has its say on the EU's budget. The same asymmetry holds, however, also in budget procedures
and EP's in°uence is limited only to a small part of the budget. EP's acceptance is also required for the
entry of new member states, the rati¯cation of international agreements, the so-called assent procedure,
and, moreover, the appointment of the Commission. In three latter cases, however, EP merely exerts veto
power rather than constructive power, which is the main emphasis of this paper.
16both EP and CM have less scope for a®ecting the status quo than before enlargement.
Recent attempts to reform EU decision-making, like the proposal of the Convention
headed by Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, have aimed at lowering the majority threshold in CM.
In relative terms, CM's quota has remained practically unchanged through the history of
the EC/EU. In Nice, despite the awareness of enlargement's deteriorating impact on EU's
capacity to act, national governments actually decided to increase the quota (for discussion
see Baldwin et al. 2001). The Nice agreement has been slightly modi¯ed by 2003's Act
Concerning the Conditions of Accession, but still the quota in the weight dimension is
higher than it was before Nice. The two additional requirements relating to the number of
supporters of a proposal and their aggregate population size compound this. Enlargement
according to the (modi¯ed) Nice rules has made EP almost powerless and shifted codecision
back towards inter-governmentalism. Moreover, combined with the e®ects of expanding
membership, it has weakened the EU's capacity to act quite considerably. Baldwin et al.
(2001), using quite di®erent methodology, argue that in order to restore EU15's capacity
to act in an enlarged Union, the Council's quota should be lowered to around 67%. This
is broadly in line with our ¯ndings because for a constant quota EP's loss of constructive
in°uence due to enlargement is only partially compensated by a corresponding increase for
CM.
In October 2004, the EU Heads of States signed the Treaty establishing a Constitution
for Europe, which comes into force in November 2006 if rati¯ed by the member states. As
part of the Treaty, new voting rules for the Council were set. They will come into force in
November 2009.19 Then, passage of a proposal requires 55% of member states representing
65% of EU population; at least four member states are needed for a blocking minority
and at least 15 member states must vote yes (for an assessment of dual majority rules see
Baldwin and Widgr¶ en 2004a, 2004b). The last condition becomes irrelevant after the EU is
enlarged to 27 members (15
27 < 55%). The new rules decrease the e®ective quota compared
to the Nice rules, but it is di±cult to say to which level since three rules are mixed.20 As
Fig. 4 indicates, the rules in the Constitutional Treaty would increase both EP's and CM's
constructive power.
5.4 Discussion
This section looks at the justi¯cation for some of our simplifying assumptions and discusses
the robustness of our ¯ndings. To start with, let us reconsider voting in CM and relax the
above one-country-one-vote simpli¯cation.
The generating function method for the computation of the Shapley-Shubik index, ¯rst
used by Mann and Shapley (1962) (also see Algaba et al. 2003), can be adapted to compute
19The next enlargement may materialize in 2007, the year to which the entry of Rumania and Bulgaria
currently are scheduled. The Treaty de¯nes CM's voting rule also for EU27 but not the distribution of
national seats in EP. The maximum number of seats is set to 750; details will be decided before the next
European elections in 2009.
20Note e.g. that 22 smallest member states have 88 per cent of membership but less than 65 per cent of
population. The blocking minority requirement allows them to pass proposals nevertheless.
17the exact probability that the pivotal player for the current three-dimensional weighted
voting rule is found at position k = 1;:::;25. The event \pivotal player found at position
k" corresponds to a set of particular permutations (¢) of the list of players 1;:::;25, which
are all equiprobable under our a priori assumption of independently identically distributed
ideal points. The event is independent of the realization of an ordered list (¹(1);:::;¹(25)) of
25 anonymous ideal points, with each ¹(k) a priori having a beta distribution with density
f~ ¹(k). Denoting the probability of ¯nding the pivotal Council member at position k by pk,
the probability density function of the random pivotal player's ideal point is thus given ex
ante by
f~ ¹(~ p)(x) =
25 X
k=1
pk ¢ f~ ¹(k)(x):
Using this instead of f~ ¹(18)(x) in (7), one can calculate EP's and CM's expected marginal
impact on the codecision outcome for weighted voting in CM. For current weights, we
obtain 0:037 and 0:543 for EP and CM, respectively. So intra-institutional weights { in
contrast to the intra-institutional quota { have a very minor e®ect on inter-institutional
power.
Using a one-country-one-vote approximation somewhat understates the in°uence of EP
and slightly overstates that of CM (compare rows 2 and 4 in Table 1). Intuitively, this is
because the existence of large players inside CM spreads out the distribution of the position
~ ¼ determining CM's bargaining success. This is most obvious in the asymmetric limit case
of weighted voting, namely one member of CM being a dictator. Then, ~ ¼ would always be
identical to this member's uniformly distributed ideal point. CM would hence no longer
be a priori more conservative than EP and, as an institution, be roughly equally powerful
as EP.
A second slight understatement of EP's in°uence in the previous sections arises from
our assumption that the ideal points of all MEPs matter equally in the determination of
~ ¹. MEPs in reality belong to political parties who attempt to coordinate voting behavior
amongst their members. The position of the pivotal party need not actually coincide with
what is the pivotal MEP's ideal point. This has a slight impact on the position of the EP
median and the aggregate in°uence of EP.
Currently, EP has seven major parties. The enlargement did not change this, so that
the decrease in EP's power as a result of enlargement should in reality be less dramatic
than shown in Fig. 5. Still, the earlier qualitative conclusion remains valid: Expanding
membership and thus the number of players in CM boosts the relative threshold e®ect at
low quotas, which works in favour of CM. It also strengthens the absolute threshold e®ect
at high quotas, which decreases both bodies' constructive power. The rate at which EP's
power decreases is slightly lower if we assume correlation in EP, and the turning point
beyond which CM's power decreases shifts towards lower quotas.
For weighted voting in CM and assuming seven equal-sized parties in EP we obtain
0:089 and 0:464 for EP and CM respectively (row 5 in Table 1). To obtain an upper bound
for EP's in°uence, one can consider the extreme case of only one party in the Parliament.
Even then, using the current quota, CM's power is roughly four times EP's power (row 6
18in Table 1). Our main qualitative conclusion of pronounced asymmetry is very robust.
A third potential source of understatement of EP's power stems from our uniform
distribution assumption. Assuming a unimodal distribution with smaller variance, e.g.
truncated normal with mean 0.5, for members of CM and EP would shift the distribution
of CM's pivot closer to that of EP's median. This would somewhat raise EP's chances to
be critical, and lower CM's at least in relative terms.21 Parliamentary systems selecting the
members of CM (vs. direct proportional election of EP) might moreover justify to assume
smaller variance for ministers' than for MEPs' ideal points. This would again somewhat
increase the likelihood of EP holding the more conservative position (and determining
the codecision outcome). However, unless very extreme distributional asymmetries are
considered, CM by its quali¯ed majority rule remains the by far more in°uential institution.
Another feature with limited qualitative impact is potential national bias in MEPs'
voting behaviour. Textbook presentations of the EP usually characterize it as a mixture
of national and political dimensions that interplay in MEPs' decisions. Noury and Roland
(2002) show, however, that MEPs vote more along party than country lines, making EP a
truly supranational European body which has a party cohesion comparable to that of the
U.S. Congress. Introducing moderately positive correlation between a country's minister
and its MEPs would not very signi¯cantly change results and actually decrease EP's in°u-
ence. If MEPs voted purely according to their nationality, EP would be powerless in the
sense that it did little more than rubber-stamping the decisions of the Council in view of
the latter's more restrictive majority requirement (see Bindseil and Hantke 1997 on this
argument).
Our analysis has been based on spatial voting and { where available { the o±cial
rules for codecision. We believe that this rather legalistic approach is appropriate for
the constitutional analysis we do. However, the model may not predict particular policy
outcomes or in°uence in today's decisions in the EU that well. The empirical success of
(procedural) spatial voting models in explaining actual outcomes of EU decision-making
has so far been limited (see Thompson et al. 2003). So-called institutional realists point
out that this results from paying too much attention to the legal details of a particular
decision procedure and too little to global voting power and economic power in the EU
(see Achen 2003). They propose to view outcomes as compromises reached in informal
bargaining without predetermined rules; these are later o±cially adopted according to the
o±cial rules. This is a plausible explanation for the observation that decisions, at least
by CM, are often taken (almost) unanimously where only a quali¯ed majority is required.
The latter can, however, have other and quite trivial reasons, e.g. that dissenting ministers
do not want to be seen losing and keep their face by pretending to agree.
In our view the main limitation of our analysis is not that we take the legal rules se-
riously, but that we neglect e®ects of their repeated invocation. We treated every issue {
corresponding to a new realization of status quo and individual ideal points { as isolated,
i.e. there was no cross-issue compromising or logrolling. This seems to us a reasonable as-
21Both institutions would ¯nd themselves on the same side of status quo more frequently, so that the
absolute e®ect on CM's in°uence depends on the particular distribution.
19sumption at the inter-institutional level: di®erent issues frequently fall into the competence
of di®erent parliamentary committees and hence di®erent EP delegations; ministers with
di®erent portfolios are involved on CM's part, whose rotating presidency should further
decrease repeated game e®ects. However, at the intra-institutional level log-rolling can be
more of an issue. This applies, in particular, to CM whose members interact repeatedly
with an inde¯nite time horizon.
So what happens to inter-institutional power if we assume CM to not espouse the ideal
point of the member who happens to be pivotal on a given policy issue, but rather some
convex combination of this point and a kind of average of all positions? The latter could,
for example, be an informal repeated game compromise in which members' ex ante voting
power is used to weight positions.22 Council members' ex ante voting powers by de¯nition
do not depend on the particular realization of ideal points for an issue at hand. The mean of
the a priori distribution of CM's ideal point in this case lies closer to the mean of individual
ideal points than when only the pivotal member's position is considered. This would make
CM less conservative on average { increasing both the chances to reach an agreement with
EP and the latter's average in°uence. However, as long as CM's issue-speci¯c pivot comes
with any extra in°uence on the aggregate ideal point, ~ ¼, CM's quota has an e®ect on the
probability of CM determining the codecision agreement. A signi¯cantly higher quota in
CM than in EP then still implies more power for the EU's intergovernmental body and
less for its directly elected one.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have dealt with the impact of internal voting rules on the inter-institutional
distribution of power. Our interest has been in EU codecision, but it should be obvious that
the analysis extends to other contexts (for example, the U.N. Security Council understood
as a chamber of ¯ve permanent members with unanimity rule and a second chamber of ro-
tating members with only 4/10 majority rule). We found that a high internal quota makes
it highly likely that CM via bargaining's status quo bias determines outcomes. This gives
it much more constructive in°uence than EP. The high internal quota of CM also promotes
institutional status quo bias: It is quite probable that respective EP and CM pivots prefer
opposite changes to the status quo.23 Thus, fewer and fewer proposed policy changes get
implemented as the quota is increased or kept constant for expanding membership; players
then exercise less and less constructive in°uence.
We agree with most observers of European integration that EU decision-making has
developed in the direction of a balanced bicameral system. The set of policy areas to which
codecision applies has been extended, gradually making it the most important decision-
22This is exactly what the compromise model favoured by institutional realists does. For an excellent
and detailed discussion see Achen (2003).
23Note that we do not consider actors' blocking power. In our setting, blocking takes only place if EP's
and CM's ideal points are on a di®erent side of the legislative status quo. This situation is symmetric {
each institution would have the same ex post and, hence, ex ante blocking power.
20making procedure of the EU. Moreover, the Amsterdam version of codecision gives neither
EP nor CM a signi¯cant direct procedural advantage. However, the { only apparent { sym-
metry between Parliament and Council in the crucial stage of codecision, the Conciliation
Committee, is not su±cient to make them equally powerful co-legislators.
Our arguments are based on common spatial voting assumptions, bargaining theory,
and the strategic power framework of Napel and Widgr¶ en (2004). We made several sim-
pli¯cations that should be relaxed in future research.
First, we did not carry out very detailed analysis of the impact of weighted voting
in the Council (see, however, the previous section and rows 4{6 in Table 1). Our pre-
liminary computations con¯rm that current weights in CM have only second-order e®ects
on inter-institutional power, very slightly strengthening EP. Looking at the measures of
national power of CM's members which we obtain as intermediate results to the inter-
institutional computations, it turns out that the ¯gures are roughly proportional to those
of the intra-CM Shapley-Shubik index (which are, in turn, very similar to those of the
normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index). Together with our ¯nding of CM being the institu-
tion that dominates even the codecison procedure, this gives some new spatial-voting and
strategic-analysis support to the application of classical power indices in the EU context
(much criticized by Garrett and Tsebelis 1999). Still, it deserves emphasis that our strate-
gic setting makes a di®erence. Without actually doing the strategic analysis, a wholesale
restriction of power investigations to CM has little legitimation. Also, classical indices
cannot pick up implications of strategic interaction like bargaining's status quo bias. They
therefore, e.g., must treat swings or pivot positions in an institution like CM indepen-
dently of their actual e®ects in the decision process as a whole. Some countries' pivotal
positions come with greater likelihood that CM (and so CM's pivot) actually prevails in its
codecision interaction with EP. This is why national power in codecision via CM is only
roughly proportional to classical indices. There are quite large relative errors for small
member states whose (few) pivot positions turn out to matter more per position than
those of large countries. Furthermore, the danger of a high quota bringing decision making
to a standstill, i.e. institutional status quo bias, is more reliably quanti¯ed when players
are assumed to actively negotiate compromises if they exist, rather than to be randomly
in favour or against unspeci¯ed exogenous proposals.24
Second, we considered one isolated instance of bargaining between players who su®ered
exactly the same disutility from distance to their respective ideal points. Thus, repeated-
game e®ects (typically allowing for a great multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes) and log-
rolling based on player-speci¯c utility and / or di®erent distance functions (weighting policy
dimensions by subjective measures of salience), were not dealt with. These simpli¯cations
have limited policy implications, though: Log-rolling complicates the derivation of the
contract curve considerably, but the essential bargaining problem of selecting among many
Pareto-e±cient alternatives (with di®erent distributional consequences) remains the same.
24The non-normalized Penrose-Banzhaf index is sometimes used to analyse `resistance' against imple-
menting change in the latter vein. Actors' Penrose-Banzhaf measures typically do not sum up to one. The
higher the vote threshold in a voting body, the lower this sum gets { indicating high resistance (see e.g.
Widgr¶ en 1996 or Felsenthal and Machover 2001).
21Also, regular national and European elections limit the scope for sophisticated repeated-
game strategies of EP and CM as institutions. More controversial in our view is the
hypothesis that Council and Parliament are represented essentially by their respective
pivotal members in their negotiations { which is unfortunately standard. This neglects the
e®ects of intra-institutional informal compromising and log-rolling (especially inside the
Council) and restricts both institutions to exhibit a high level of collective rationality.
Appendix 1
Proposition 2 { Proof. Without loss of generality assume q = 0 and let ui(¸i) = 0.
Utility is the same concave strictly decreasing function of distance to the respective ideal
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is symmetric w.r.t. the 45±-line. So Á(Á(u¼)) = Á(u¹) = u¼, which implies
Á
0(~ u¼) = ¡1 (8)
for ¯xed point ~ u¼ = Á(~ u¼). Concavity of utility function u(¢) translates into concavity of




¸ ¡1; u¼ < ~ u¼;
· ¡1; u¼ > ~ u¼: (9)
Now assume uq
¼ > uq
¹ and ¯rst note that in this case EP and CM will not agree on the
endpoint of the contract curve most preferred by CM:
1. Consider uEP(¹) < uq
¼, i.e. CM's ideal point leaves EP worse o® than the status
quo. The endpoint of the contract curve preferred by CM then gives exactly utility
u¼ = uq
¼ to EP, implying that the Nash product N(u¼;u¹) ´ (u¼ ¡ uq
¼)(u¹ ¡ uq
¹) is
zero. Since it is positive in the interior of the contract curve, this cannot be the Nash
bargaining outcome.
2. Consider uEP(¹) ¸ uq
¼, i.e. CM's ideal point leaves EP weakly better o® than the
status quo. CM's preferred endpoint of the contract curve in this case is ¹ and yields
utility 0 to CM and Á(0) < 0 to EP. This is no solution either: The change in the
Nash product N(u¼;u¹) implied by moving slightly from ¹ towards ¼ is captured
by its directional derivative at (Á(0);0) along the Pareto frontier, i.e. in direction of




























22Á(0) < ~ u¼, so (9) implies 0 ¸ Á
0(Á(0))) ¸ ¡1. Therefore, given uq
¹ < uq
¼ < 0, the
¯rst summand is strictly positive. Both Á(0) and Á
0(Á(0)) are negative, so the second
summand is positive, too. Therefore, N0
a(Á(0);0) > 0 and (Á(0);0) cannot maximize
N(¢).
It follows that EP and CM must either agree on ¼, in which case u¤
¼ > u¤
¹ is obvious,
or on some point in the interior of the contract curve which is characterized by tangency
of an iso-N(¢) line and Á(¢) in (u¤
¼;u¤





































¼ · ~ u¼, which implies Á






¹ and supposing u¤
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¹ a contradiction can be shown (for
any interior solution g0(u¤
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